COALITION FOR ECONOMIC EQUITY V WILSON by unknown
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice
Volume 4 | Issue 1 Article 6
Spring 4-1-1998
COALITION FOR ECONOMIC EQUITY V
WILSON
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice at Washington & Lee
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an
authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
COALITION FOR ECONOMIC EQUITY V WILSON, 4 Race & Ethnic Anc. L. J. 47 (1998).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol4/iss1/6
COALITION FOR ECONOMIC EQUITY V WILSON'
I. FACTS
In 1996 California voters passed Proposition 209, the
California Civil Rights Initiative, as an amendment to the
state's Constitution.2 Essentially, the passage of
Proposition 209 did away with all public race and gen-
der-based affirmative action programs in California.3
After Proposition 209 passed, the plaintiffs, representing
racial minorities and women, filed a complaint in U.S.
District Court against state officials and political subdivi-
sions.4 The plaintiffs alleged that Proposition 209, first,
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and second, was void under the Supremacy
Clause for conflicting with Titles VI and VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and Title IX of the Educational
Amendments of 1972.1 The plaintiffs asked the District
Court to declare Proposition 209 unconstitutional and
issue a permanent injunction enjoining the State from
implementing and enforcing Proposition 209.6
Plaintiffs also petitioned for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction, both of which
were granted by the court. The District Court granted
both the TRO and the preliminary injunction.' The
injunction barred the State from implementation and
enforcement of Proposition 209 until a trial or final judg-
ment.'Through its fact finding process, the District Court
determined that the elimination of race and gender-
based affirmative action programs would reduce con-
tract, employment, and educational opportunities for
minorities and women.9 The District Court also found
that if the affirmative action programs were to be rein-
stated, the California Constitution would have to be
amended by another initiative.'" Based on these facts, the
District Court concluded that the plaintiffs had shown a
likelihood of success on their equal protection claim."
Second, the District Court decided that the plaintiffs
had shown a likelihood of success as to their pre-emption
claim.The court supported its conclusion by finding that
Title VII preempts Proposition 209 under the Supremacy
'The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari for
this case.
2Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 110 E3d 1431,
1434 (9th Cir. 1997).







9 d. at 1435.
Clause.'I The District Court determined that Proposition
209 in effect eliminates employer discretion to use race
and gender preferences - discretion that, in the District
Court's view, Title VII preserves. 3 To the extent that the
Proposition banned such preferences, the court held that
Title VII pre-empts it under the Supremacy Clause. 4
The District Court concluded that if the injunction was
not imposed, minorities and women would suffer irrepara-
ble harm as Proposition 209 immediately would ban existing
preference programs in violation of the plaintiffs constitu-
tional rights.'5 In contrast, the State would suffer little harm
by waiting to implement Proposition 209.6 Finally, the
District Court also decided that the public interest would be
served by granting the preliminary injunction.'7 The court
believed that" [p] reserving the pre-election status quo would
'harmonize' the public need for'clear guidance with respect
to Proposition 209' with 'the compelling interest in remedy-
ing discrimination that underlies existing constitutionally-
permissible state-sponsored affirmative action programs
threatened by Proposition 209-1I After the district court
granted the plaintiffs TRO and preliminary injunction, the
defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
II. HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit overruled the District Court and
the Supreme Court denied certiorari. The Ninth Circuit
held that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood
of success on the merits of their equal protection and
supremacy causes of actions, nor that they would face
irreparable harm if Proposition 209 was implemented. 9
III.ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
A court may grant a preliminary injunction "if the
movant has shown a likelihood of success on either the
merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that
serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships











2Id. at 1438, quoting Armstrong v. Mazurek, 94 E3d 566,
567 (1996).
Court of Appeals had to determine whether the District
Court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary
injunction.2 "An abuse of discretion occurs if the district
court 'bases its decision on an erroneous legal standard
or on clearly erroneous findings of fact."'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first analyzed the
District Court's conclusion that the plaintiffs demon-
strated a likelihood of success on their claim that
Proposition 209 violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.23 The court's equal protec-
tion analysis posed two questions. First, whether an erro-
neous legal premise was used in conventional equal pro-
tection analysis, and secondly, whether an erroneous
legal premise was used in "political structure" equal pro-
tection analysis.24
Conventional equal protection analysis looks to the
substance of the law at issue. 2 The Court of Appeals ulti-
mately found that Proposition 209 is constitutional as a
matter of conventional equal protection. 26 Because
Proposition 209 prohibits the government from discrimi-
nating against or giving preferential treatment to any per-
son on account of race or gender, Proposition 209 is nec-
essarily constitutional.27 Plaintiffs contended that racial
groups and women would be denied equal protection
because Proposition 209 would deny them preferential
treatment - treatment intended to place them on equal
footing with non-minorities.' The Court of Appeals dis-
agreed, relying on the fundamental notion that the
Constitution prohibits the government from classifying
individuals by race or gender, unless the classification sat-
isfies the exacting judicial scrutiny of the court.29 Because
Proposition 209 prohibits the government from classify-
ing individuals based on race or gender, as opposed to
allowing for the classification of individuals by race or
gender,°3 it could not be found to violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution under
conventional equal protection analysis.3"
The Court of Appeals next examined the political
structure analysis of the Equal Protection Clause, an
211d.; See also Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v.
National Football League, 634 E2d 1197,1200 (9th Cir. 1980),
stating that the level of review for a preliminary injunction is
abuse of discretion.
221d, quoting American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.











analysis that "looks to the level of government at which
the law was enacted."32 The plaintiffs' primary con-
tention, introduced in the District Court and before the
Ninth Circuit, was that Proposition 209 imposed an
unequal political structure that denied minorities and
women preferential treatment at the lowest level of gov-
ernment.33 The lowest level of government varies
depending on which levels of government are com-
pared. For example, the state could be the lowest level of
government if compared with the federal government. In
this case, the lowest level of government is the munici-
pal government.
The District Court relied on Hunter v. Erickson,"
which held unconstitutional an amendment to the Akron
city charter barring the City Council from enacting ordi-
nances pertaining to racial discrimination, unless the
Akron voters approved.3 5 In Hunter, the Supreme Court
determined that a compelling state interest did not exist
to justify making it more difficult to enact legislation
which benefitted racial minorities. 36 Using Hunter, the
District Court concluded that Proposition 209, like the
Akron city charter amendment, placed unique political
burdens on racial classifications and gender preferences
and that no compelling state interest existed for making
them appeal to a state-wide electorate.3 7 Before the pas-
sage of Proposition 209, minorities and women could
petition the local government for preferential treat-
ment .3 Post Proposition 209, the district court found
that minorities and women had to "appeal to the
statewide electorate, a 'new and remote level of govern-
ment,"' to obtain preferential treatment.3 9
The state contended that Proposition 209 did not
reallocate political authority in a discriminatory manner
and, additionally, that a majority of the electorate can not
restructure the political process to discriminate against
itself. 40
The Court of Appeals looked to the Supreme Court's
decision in Crawford v. Board of Education of the City









391d. citing Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 946 F
Supp. 1480 (N.D. Ca. 1996).
401d.
4'Crawford v. Board of Education of the City of Los
Angeles, 458 U.S. 527,532 (1982).
nized an explicit distinction "between state action that
discriminates on the basis of race and state action that
addresses, in neutral fashion, race-related matters."4 The
Court held that an amendment to the California
Constitution was constitutional where the amendment
prohibited state courts "from mandating pupil assign-
ment or transportation except to remedy a specific equal
protection violation." 3 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals gave great consideration to the Supreme Court's
decision in Crawford that "the simple repeal or modifi-
cation of desegregation or antidiscrimination laws, with-
out more, never has been viewed as embodying a pre-
sumptively invalid racial classification."44 In light of
Crawford, the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded
that the Hunter doctrine did not apply because there
was not a discriminatory reallocation of political author-
ity in the case before the court.45 The Ninth Circuit held
that a state may create a law that involves race and gen-
der related issues in a neutral fashion,46 and that political
processes may be restructured, so long as an individual's
right to equal protection is not denied, i.e. the individ-
ual's right to equal treatment is not burdened.
4 7
If plaintiffs want to prove that a change in political
structure would deny equal protection, they must show
that individuals would be treated unequally if the change
occurred.' The Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs were
really claiming that Proposition 209 would prevent them
from receiving preferential treatment.4 9 However," [iimped-
iments to equal protection do not [always] deny equal pro-
tection" 5 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that Proposition 209 placed the same "equal
protection" burdens on individuals seeking race and gen-
der preferences as does the Constitution.51 In other words,
Proposition 209 is consistent with the Constitution; both
the Constitution and Proposition 209 want all citizens to
be treated equally. Racial preferences are unconstitutional
unless there is some compelling circumstance.
2
1
2Crawford, 458 U.S. at 538.
4 Coalition for Economic Equity, 110 E3d at 1443.








While the Constitution does not require a state to
have narrowly tailored racial preferences, a state may if
there is a compelling state interest. 3 "The Fourteenth
Amendment . . . does not require what it barely per-
mits."' 4 With this in mind, the Court of appeals deter-
mined that the District Court relied on an erroneous
legal premise in finding that the plaintiffs showed a like-
lihood of success on their equal protection claim."
The Court of Appeals next applied the erroneous
legal premise standard to the District Court's finding of a
likelihood of success with the preemption claim. The
court turned to the 1964 Civil Rights Act and noted that
state laws will only be preempted if they are in actual
conflict with federal law.6 The court, relying on the fact
that the plain language of Title VII does not require states
to give preferential treatment of minorities or women,
concluded that Proposition 209 was consistent with the
1964 Civil RightsAct.'7 The Court ofAppeals decided that
the District Court also relied on an erroneous legal
premise in finding that the plaintiffs would be likely to
succeed under their preemption claim.'
IV. CONCLUSION
The scenario will become more interesting if the
plaintiffs now decide to pursue the case on the merits. If
the substance of Proposition 209 is upheld by the
Supreme Court, the law of Proposition 209 and Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke" will conflict.
This case is important because plaintiffs now must
decide whether or not to pursue their claim. If the plain-
tiffs believe that a case on the merits would render the
same decision, they may decide not to go forward.









59Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978), holding that race may be taken into account in
admission programs.
